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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of raising the State Pension age on women's
health. Exploiting a UK pension reform that increased women's State Pension
age for up to 6 years since 2010, we show that raising the State Pension age
leads to an increase of up to 12 percentage points in the probability of depres-
sive symptoms, alongside an increase in self-reported medically diagnosed
depression among women in a lower occupational grade. Our results suggest
that these effects are driven by prolonged exposure to high-strain jobs
characterised by high demands and low control. Effects are consistent across
multiple subcomponents of the General Health Question and Short-Form-12
(SF-12) scores, and robust to alternative empirical specifications, including
“placebo” analyses for women who never worked and for men.
KEYWORD S
economics of ageing, public health, public pensions, social security, understanding society
J E L C LA S S I F I C A T I ON
J26; H75; I18; I14
1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have increased
their statutory pensionable age (SPA) with the aim of enhancing the financial sustainability of pension systems
(OECD, 2016). The rationale behind these reforms is that increased employment opportunities, longer life expectancy,
and more years spent in good health will enable older people to work longer and retire later (OECD, 2016;
OECD, 2017a). Although evidence suggests that health is the most important cause of early retirement (Munnell,
Sanzenbacher, & Rutledge, 2015), understanding how policies delaying retirement influence health is critical to
assessing the reforms' total utility (Heller-Sahlgren, 2017).
This study assesses the health impact of a recent reform that gradually increased the SPA from age 60 up to 66 years
for women born after March 1950 in the United Kingdom. The effect of an increase in SPA is ambiguous as several
mechanisms may be at play. The Grossman model considers health as both an investment good that increases produc-
tivity and a consumption good that provides utility (Galama & Kapteyn, 2011; Grossman, 1972). On the one hand,
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workers may invest more in their health if they expect to retire later, for example, by engaging in healthy behaviours if
the benefits of a longer working life induced by better health are higher than the costs of reduced leisure-time due to a
shorter retirement period (Bertoni, Brunello, & Mazzarella, 2018). Alternatively, as postponing retirement increases the
opportunity cost of time, individuals might trade-off health investments (exercising, cooking healthier food, attending
medical visits) for working time (Galama & Kapteyn, 2011). Later retirement may also directly enter the health produc-
tion function, for example, through higher social engagement, mental wellbeing, cognitive function, and other non-
financial benefits of work (Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2017). The type of occupation, however, may be critical to
understanding the way these mechanisms operate. In particular, later retirement for workers in a low occupational
grade may increase exposure to work-related psychological and physical strain, which may result in poorer health as a
result of extended exposure to these factors (Galama & Kapteyn, 2011). This is consistent with recent literature
suggesting that workers subject to high job strain, as measured by high job demand (physical and psychosocial) and
low job control (limited decision authority and intellectual discretion), experience worse health outcomes than workers
with occupations subject to low job strain (see Marmot et al. (1991), Karasek (1979), and Ravesteijn, Kippersluis, and
Doorslaer (2018)).
Several studies examine how health is affected after retirement, with findings being sensitive to the choice of coun-
try, empirical strategy, and health outcome. Some studies find that retirement has positive effect on mental (Belloni,
Meschi, & Pasini, 2016; Eibich, 2015) and physical health (Bertoni, Maggi, & Weber, 2017; Coe and Zamarro, 2011),
while other studies report either a negative (Behncke, 2012; Bonsang, Adam, & Perelman, 2012; Mazzonna &
Peracchi, 2017) or no effect of retirement on health (Coe and Lindeboom, 2008; Coe and Zamarro, 2011). By contrast,
few studies have evaluated how recent reforms to the SPA influence the health of older people, and existing studies are
mixed. A reform that postponed early retirement age by 5 years and reduced early pension replacement rates for civil
servants in the Netherlands led to worse mental health (De Grip, Lindeboom, & Montizaan, 2012). In Israel, Shai (2018)
found that a 2-year increase in the male SPA led to worsening health, as did Atalay and Barrett (2014) for an Australian
reform that raised the female SPA by 5 years (spanned in 20 years). Bertoni et al. (2018) found that delaying statutory
early retirement-age improved healthy behaviours and health satisfaction among Italian men in their 40s. Two studies
evaluated the long-term impact of reforms lowering SPA, finding positive effects in the Netherlands within 5 years of
retirement (Bloemen, Hochguertel, & Zweerink, 2017) and no effects in Norway (Hernaes, Markussen, Piggott, &
Vestad, 2013).
Our study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge, this is the first study on
the health effects of a unique UK reform that increased the SPA by up to 6 years over a short time window of 10 years.
We differentiate from most earlier studies which examined how health changes after retirement as a result of cross-
country variation in SPA (Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2017), or employer-based retirement windows (Behncke, 2012;
Bonsang et al., 2012; Eibich, 2015), by focusing on a national policy change that affected the SPA of a well-defined
cohort of women. We implement a difference-in-differences approach comparing the health status of women unable to
collect their State Pension because of the SPA change with the health of women of similar age and characteristics who
were unaffected by the change by virtue of their birthdate. Second, we are able to examine heterogeneity by job-type
and job-stress in the causal effect of postponing SPA on health. Previous studies focusing on the health-transition after
retirement found stronger effects on the health of workers from lower socioeconomic status (SES), who face lower life
expectancy and income, more barriers to reemployment, and to good-quality care (Belloni et al., 2016; Bertoni
et al., 2017; Coe, von Gaudecker, Lindeboom, & Maurer, 2012; Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2017). Yet, there is limited empir-
ical evidence on whether increased exposure to job stressors might explain the impact of extended work horizon on
health. By implementing validated indicators of job demand and job control, we investigate the role of longer exposure
to job strain as a result of an increase in the SPA. Third, we are able to estimate nonlinearities in the effect of increases
in SPA by comparing cohorts that experienced vastly different SPA extensions. This is possible because of the nature of
the reform, which led to a relatively wide range of SPA increases (1 to 60 months) in a short period of a few years.
Using Understanding Society, a nationally representative survey with extensive health measures, we find that SPA
increases had a negative impact on health: women aged 60–64 years who are no longer eligible to collect their pension
due to the reform exhibit worse mental and physical health scores (PCSs) and higher prevalence of clinical depression
than women of the same age unaffected by the reform. Moreover, longer extensions of SPA led to higher declines in
mental health than shorter extensions. Crucially, the negative health effect of SPA postponement is confined to women
from lower-grade routine occupations, and it is largely driven by longer exposure to adverse psychological and physical
stressors. As a result, the reform had the undesirable consequence of increasing health inequality by occupational
grade, as evidence points to a 12 percentage-point increase in the probability of depressive symptomatology (General
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Health Question [GHQ] scores) for women in lower-grade occupations, which constitute clinically and economically
meaningful changes. Moreover, we find a statistically significant 4.5% decline in PCSs for women in lower-grade occu-
pations, although this is likely to be of less clinical relevance.
In what follows, Section 2 summarises the UK pension reform, Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy,
while Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our findings.
2 | STATE PENSION AGE POSTPONEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The reform of the female SPA in the United Kingdom, legislated in 1995 and implemented in 2010, affected the mini-
mum age for claiming the Basic State Pension (BSP), which provides an almost-flat level of retirement income,
depending on National Insurance contribution years. Although generally low by OECD standards, the BSP corresponds
to around 38% of average gross income for retired households in the United Kingdom, thus representing a main income
source for a significant proportion of older people (Webber & Mallet, 2017). In 2010, the full annual BSP amounted to
£5,077.8 for a single individual and £8,119.8 for a couple (see OECD (2013), PPI (2015) and Lain (2016)). The SPA,
which was set at 60 years prior to the reform, was first legislated to raise to 65 between 2010 and 2020 (an effective
increase of 1 month every 2 months). Subsequent reforms then legislated for both men's and women's SPA to reach
66 by 2020, 67 by 2028, and 68 by 2046 (see Thurley and Keen (2017) for comprehensive details).
The impact of the reform on pension eligibility, based on birthdate, is substantial (Figure 1): being born 1 year after
March 1950 implies a 1-year delay in SPA. The SPA postponement exceeds 36 months for cohorts born after March
1953. Thus, women born just a few years apart face different eligibility status (above vs. below SPA) at any given age
(right panel): for example, a woman aged 60 years in 2009 is above her SPA, while a woman aged 60 years in 2012 is
2 years below her SPA. The Institute for Fiscal Studies estimated that the policy increased female employment rates by
10 percentage points (Cribb & Emmerson, 2018).
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Data
We use data from seven Waves (2009–2016) of Understanding Society, an annual survey interviewing household
members aged 16+ years in Britain, on health, social, and economics subjects (Lynn (2009)). From information on year
and month of birth and interview date, we determine whether an individual lies above or below her SPA when inter-
viewed. We employ self-reported information on employment-status (“in-paid-work,” “unemployed,” “retired,”
FIGURE 1 Change in women State Pension age.
Note. Authors' calculations based on Pension Act 1995, 2011 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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“looking after family or home,” “long-term sick/disabled”), as well as information on living arrangements, employment
history, number of children, educational attainment, and SES (detailed hereafter).
We employ three validated measures of mental and physical health (detailed in Appendix 1). The General Health
Questionnaire index (GHQ-12) measures psychological distress, on a scale between 0 and 36, with higher values signal-
ling worse health. As a score of 12+ signals the presence of common mental disorders (Goldberg et al., 1997; Goldberg &
Williams, 1988), a GHQ-caseness is built to identify respondents lying above and below the cutoff. We further disaggre-
gate the GHQ score in three clinically meaningful factors (anxiety/depression, social-dysfunction, and loss-of-confi-
dence), following Graetz (1991). We normalise the GHQ scores between 0 and 100.
The Short-Form-12 (SF-12, version2) is a generic health-related quality of life instrument which produces a PCS and
a mental health score (MCS), each ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values signalling better health. Eight meaningful
subfactors are also considered: physical functioning, role-limitations due to (a) physical or (b) emotional problems,
mental health, bodily pain, general health, vitality/energy/fatigue, and social functioning (methodological details are
available in Ware (2002) and Appendix 1). Both the GHQ and the SF-12 are widely used in the economics literature as
generic measures of physical and mental health (Bünnings, Kleibrink, & Weßling, 2017; Clark, 2003; Dustmann &
Fasani, 2016; Marcus, 2013; Mitra & Jones, 2017; Schmitz, 2011). In addition, we also employ information on chronic
diseases that respondents report to have been diagnosed with by a doctor.1
3.2 | Meaningful changes and effect size
In order to evaluate the clinical relevance of any impact of the SPA reform on health, we follow two approaches. First,
we compare our results for continuous health outcomes to the concept of the Minimally Important Difference (MID),
that is, a change large enough to be discernible by patients. The general approach to MID is to compute the “effect-size”
(ES), that is, the ratio between the estimated effect and the standard deviation of that outcome (Cohen, 2013). Fayers
and Hays (2014) suggest that an ES of 0.2 SD represents the threshold for a MID (see also Farivar, Liu, and Hays (2004)).
Cohen (2013) proposed operational definitions of small, medium, and large ES corresponding to 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 SD,
respectively (see also King (2011)). For the PCS outcome, we will also adopt the threshold suggested by Schmitt and Di
Fabio (2004), who estimated an “anchoring” minimum change in the PCS (6.8 points) which was found to correspond
to a unitary change in patients' Global Disability Rating.2 Indeed, in lack of an accepted gold-standard, and given that
both effects-size and anchoring are not immune to criticisms, the clinical literature recommends, when feasible, to use
both methods in order to evaluate MIDs (Fayers & Hays, 2014; Jayadevappa, Cook, & Chhatre, 2017).
Second, we estimate the impact of the reform on the aforementioned GHQ-caseness index.
3.3 | Econometric specification
We examine the impact of raising the SPA on women's health using a difference-in-differences approach on a narrow
sample of women aged 60 to 64 years between 2009 and 2016. We compare the health status of respondents who, at the
time of interview, were ineligible for the State Pension because of the reform with that of women of similar age who
were eligible to claim their State Pension and were never affected by the reform (see Shai (2018) and Bertoni
et al. (2018)).3 Age groups 60–63 years are observed both below and above-SPA, while 64 years old are above-SPA in all
years (Figure 1, right panel). Our identification strategy exploits variation in exposure to the reform by birth and inter-
view dates and relies on a comparison of health trends for age cohorts affected by the change (the 60, 61, 62, and
63-year-olds born after April 1950 became ineligible after 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016, respectively) relative to health
trends in age cohorts never affected by the reform (60–64-year-olds born before April 1950 are always eligible to claim
their State Pension).
1Self-reported diagnosis may be affected by measurement error, as some diseases remain undiagnosed, potentially leading to a zero-effect bias.
2The physical health score (PCS) anchoring suggested by Schmitt and Di Fabio (2004) is based on a sample of 155 patients with upper extremity
diagnoses in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
3To ensure a “clean” control-group, we exclude respondents above their statutory pensionable age (SPA) who had experienced an earlier
postponement in their SPA (i.e., previously affected by the reform). Results do not change in analyses that include these respondents (Appendix 1.5).
4 CARRINO ET AL.
Starting from an eligible sample of 13,084 observations (4,925 women) aged 60 to 64 years between 2009 and 2016,
we dropped 2,004 observations (15.3% of the eligible sample) of women who never worked (not affected by the SPA
increase), proxy interviews (235 observations, 1.8%), entries with missing values in our health outcomes or in other con-
trol variables (1,162 observations, 8.9%), and 2,309 observations of women observed past their State Pension age but
who had been previously affected by the reform (17.6%). Our working-sample thus comprises 7,374 observations (3,531
women).
We estimate the following reduced-form model for health outcome yiat, observed at time t for individual i of age a,
born in year-month c:
yiat = α+ β belowSPAiat + γa + ηt + δc +X 0iatφ+ εiat, ð3:1Þ
where our main independent variable of interest is an indicator function for being below SPA, that is, an interaction
between the individual's age and the interview date, which captures whether individuals were eligible to claim a State
Pension. As age is an important determinant of both State Pension eligibility and vulnerability to health shocks, we
incorporate fixed effects for age quarters (γa) to control for age-specific effects. Similarly, we include fixed effects for
interview year quarters (ηt) to capture common trend shocks in health outcomes as well as in employment rates.
Finally, we include a linear control for year-month of birth (δc) to capture cohort effects in health and labour market
attachment. These three variables are not collinear as they are included in different units and functional forms; in addi-
tion, we observe women of the same age born in different years and measured at different times. As noted by, for exam-
ple, Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow (2016), such a model assumes that age effects are cohort- and time-constant, cohort
effects are time- and age-constant, and time-effects are age- and cohort-constant, where the latter hypothesis represents
a “common-trends assumption” which we will discuss in Section 4.2.4, alongside further tests for alternative parametric
forms for age-time-cohort effects.
We control for additional observable individual- or area-specific characteristics that might confound the analysis
(Staubli & Zweimüller, 2013). Due to cohort effects, treatment and control groups might differ on several
sociodemographic characteristics. As younger cohorts in the United Kingdom have lower fertility (Kneale &
Joshi, 2008), and having children could affect both women's employment/retirement decision and the onset of health
conditions (Behncke, 2012), we include a categorical variable for having zero, one/two, or at least three children. Simi-
larly, as younger cohorts are also more likely to attain secondary education and be employed in
intermediate/managerial occupations than older cohorts (Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2017; OECD, 2015), we add one cat-
egorical variable for highest educational attainment (A-level or higher, GCSE-level, less than GCSE) and one for
having (having had) a routine-, intermediate-, or managerial-level job (NS-SEC classification).4 We account for mari-
tal status (being single, widowed/separated, or living with someone) to account for cohort differences in family forms
and living arrangements (Sobotka & Toulemon, 2008). We control for country dummies (within the United
Kingdom) to account for geographical factors that might directly affect health. Conditional on these controls, our
coefficient β captures the impact of being below the SPA as a result of the reform, above and beyond the effect of
age, year, and cohort.
We test for health inequality effects of postponing the SPA,by estimating a model including an interaction term
between the “policy variable” and the NS-SEC occupational classification (or, in alternative models, the level of job-
strain) (3.2) as follows:
yiat = α+ β1 belowSPAiat + β2  intermediateiat + β3 manageriat + β4 belowSPAiat  intermediateiat + β5 belowSPAiat
manageriat + γa + ηt + δc +X0iatφ+ εiat: ð3:2Þ
In all analyses, standard errors are clustered at the month-of-birth level (154 clusters), as the treatment assignment var-
ies by month-of-birth. Findings are robust to individual-level clustering (Section 4.2.4).
4The NS-SEC class is based on current/last occupational class, firm-size, and employment type (employer/self-employed/employee)
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3.3.1 | Effect of different levels of SPA postponement
We test how the health impact of the reform differs with the extent of SPA postponement, which widely differs for
women born after March 1950. We modify specification (3.1) as follows:
yiat = k+ λ1 I 1≤months≤ 6ð Þia + λ2 I 6<months≤ 24ð Þia + λ3 I 24<months≤ 36ð Þia + λ4 I 36<monthsð Þia + μa+ot + νc +X0iatϑ+viat,
ð3:3Þ
where we introduce dummies for having an SPA increase of 1–6, 7-25, 25-36, ≥36 months (the reference category is “no
SPA-postponement”). The SPA increase is nonlinearly related to birthdate, as the SPA is constant for women born
before April 1950 or after September 1954 while it increases nonlinearly depending on month-of-birth for women born
between March 1950 and September 1954 (Figure 1, left panel).
3.4 | Descriptive evidence
Column (i) of Table 1 summarises descriptive statistics for our original eligible sample, while Column (ii) describes the
final sample used in the statistical analysis. Around 40% falls into the manual-routine SES (mostly personal service
occupations, sales and customer services, process/plant/machine operatives, and elementary occupations); around 30%
belongs to the intermediate SES (mostly administrative and secretarial positions), and 30% falls into the higher SES
group (managers and senior officials, health, teaching, and science professionals).5 As Columns (iii) to (v) show, women
ineligible for pension exhibit higher employment, unemployment, and sick/home-carers rates, as-well-as worse MCS
and GHQ scores. Appendix Table 10 (Data S1) details the sample's age decomposition.
This pattern is further illustrated in Figure 2, where we compare employment and health outcomes for a control
group always observed above-SPA (women aged 62–64 years) and two treatment groups whose SPA-status changes over
the study period as a result of the reform (60–61 years old). Panels a and b show that retirement rates decrease while
working/being sick/caring rates increase for the treated groups when they become ineligible for State Pension, while
trends are stable for the control group (see also Cribb et al. (2016) and Staubli and Zweimüller (2013)). Interestingly,
Panels d and e show that women observed below-SPA fare worse GHQ and MCS scores. These trends, however, could
reflect cohort effects or omitted variable bias; in the next section, therefore, we turn to our econometric approach to iso-
late the casual impact of the SPA reform.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Health effects of the SPA reform
Table 2 reports the results for our main specification (3.1), estimated through OLS for the continuous health outcomes
(GHQ, MCS, PCS) and through Linear Probability Model for the GHQ cutoff. In Column 1, we estimate the effect of
the reform on female employment rates (measured with a binary indicator for being in paid work). We confirm previ-
ous findings (Cribb et al., 2016; Cribb & Emmerson, 2017) of a major shock to the employment of women whose SPA
was postponed, estimated in a 10-percentage point increase. Self-reported alternative labour market outcomes are also
affected, that is, respondents declaring to be sick (+5%), caring for the house/for someone (+2.5%), unemployed (+2%),
and retired (−21%). Table 11 includes full results.6
5Compared with our original eligible sample, the final sample is very similar in terms of average age, marital status, and number of children, yet it
exhibits generally higher education level and employment-rates, lower retirement/inactive rates, and slighter better average health scores. These
differences are likely due to the exclusion of women who never worked, who are more likely to be low-educated, retired or inactive, and in worse
health.
6Running models for “being in paid work” with interaction terms between “being below SPA” and education, marital status, number of children, and
job-category, we find no statistically significant heterogeneous effects (available upon request), suggesting that the impact of the reform was quite
similar across social groups.
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and by pension eligibility status at interview date
(i) Original eligible
sample
Mean
(ii) Final
sample
Mean
(iii) Above-SPA
at interview
Mean
(iv) Below-SPA at
interview
Mean
(v) p value (iii) v
(iv) (controlled
for birth-year)
Age 62.1 62.4 63.1 61.1 ***
Married/couple 70.4% 70.6% 70.9% 70%
Widowed/divorced 24.7% 24.6% 25% 23.9%
Single 4.9% 4.7% 4% 6.2%
Number of children 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7
Educ.: less than GCSE 23.9% 19.9% 23.9% 13%
Educ: GCSE 33.8% 34.6% 35.2% 33.6%
Educ: A-level or more 42.2% 45.5% 41% 53.8%
SPA postponement
(months)
15.7 0 43 ***
Occupational status
Employed 35.7% 43.5% 35.5% 57.6% **
Unemployed 1.4% 1.3% 0.3% 3.1% *
Retired 53.5% 47.9% 59.7% 26.7% ***
Sick/disabled 4.1% 3.3% 1.5% 6.7% ***
Caring for family/home 5.3% 3.7% 2.8% 5.1%
Socioeconomic class (NS-SEC3)
Routine 39.7% 38.6% 41.4% 33.3%
Intermediate 27.6% 28.1% 28.6% 26.9%
Higher occupations 32.7% 33.3 30.4% 38.4%
Health measures
SF-12 PCS (physical) 46.2a 46.8 46.7 47.1
SF-12 MCS (mental) 50.6a 51 51.5 49.9
GHQ-12 (0–100 scale) 30.9b 30.4 29.8 31.4 **
GHQ cutoff 36%b 33% 33% 37% *
With long term conditions at baseline
Arthritis 31.3% 31.1% 33.9% 25.6%
Coronary heart disease 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 0.7%
Angina 2.8% 2.8% 3.4% 1.8%
Heart attack 1.9% 1.9% 2.1% 1.4%
Liver condition 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3%
Diabetes 7.5% 6.9% 8.2% 4.4%
High blood pressure 25.1% 25.1% 28% 20%
Clinical depression 6.5% 5.9% 5% 7.5%
Observations 13,084 7,374 4,740 2,634
Note. The final sample includes women aged 60–64 between 2009 and 2016, observed either above-SPA (never affected by the reform) or
below-SPA (affected by the reform), having been engaged in paid work in their life. Column (iv) reports the test for the null-hypothesis of
mean-equivalence between Columns (ii) and (iii). The status of being above/below SPA is defined by comparing the individual SPA (based
on month-year of birth) and the date of interview. The SPA postponement is a distance measured in months between the individual-specific
SPA postreform and the prereform threshold of 60 years old. The job classification follows the National Statistics SEC-3 taxonomy. The GHQ
cut-off refers to the Likert GHQ scale (range: 0–36) and takes value 1 for scores of 12+ (Goldberg et al., 1997).
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SF-12, Short-Form-12; SPA, State Pen-
sion age.
aN = 11,514.
bN = 11,488.
*< 0.10.
**< 0.05.
***< 0.01.
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Column 2 indicates that being below the SPA due to the reform leads to a significant increase of 1.9 points in GHQ
depression scores. Evaluated at the sample-average GHQ score of 30.4, this corresponds to an elasticity of 6.5%. The ES
amounts to 14% of the GHQ standard deviation. Although similar ES have been defined as sizeable effects in recent
studies in economics (Dustmann & Fasani, 2016), they would not be considered meaningful under the MID rationale
(see Section 3.1). On the other hand, we estimate that the SPA reform increases the likelihood of suffering from com-
mon mental disorders (GHQ cutoff) by 6.2 percentage points (elasticity of 17%, Column 3). Negative effects (not statisti-
cally significant at 10%) are found for both the mental- and physical-health SF-12 scores.
Table 3 explores the impact of the length of SPA postponement on health (model (3.3)). Confirming previous results,
it suggests that a longer postponement of SPA leads to worse GHQ and MCS scores: for example, relative to women
unaffected by the reform, the GHQ-score increases by 1.96 points for those with an SPA increase of 6–24 months
(elasticity 6.4%) and by 3.1 for those with an increase of 36 months or more (+10.1%). The latter effect exceeds the MID
threshold (small effect, ES = 0.21). A similar result is found for the likelihood of common mental disorders (GHQ-cut-
off), and for the MCS, although the latter would not constitute a MID. No clear pattern emerges for PCS scores.
4.1.1 | SES heterogeneity
In Table 4 we show the net impact of being below-SPA for routine (Column ii), intermediate (iii) and managerial
(iv) workers, based either on their current or last occupation (model (3.2)), alongside the results from the baseline
model (3.1) in Column (i), and the sample average for each outcome. The effect of the reform on employment did not
FIGURE 2 Employment status and health scores in years 2009–2010 and 2012–2014 for women aged 60, 61, and 62–64 years.
Note. we show average values for each age-group. All respondents are above-statutory pensionable age (SPA) in 2009–2010. Women aged
60 and 61 years are below-SPA in 2012–2014 due to the reform. Higher General Health Question (GHQ; mental health score (MCS)/physical
health scores (PCS)) scores signal worse (better) health [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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differ systematically by SES: among routine SES women, the reform increased employment by 10 percentage points.
This effect is not statistically different than the employment effect for intermediate (+13.5) and managerial (+8) SES
groups.
The negative effects of the SPA reform on aggregate measures of health is significantly stronger for women in the
lowest occupations and not statistically significant for higher SES workers in managerial occupations. For routine
workers, being below-SPA significantly increases GHQ depression scores and reduces physical health SF-12 scores. The
effects observed for mental health are of clinical relevance: we estimate an increase of 3.5 points in the GHQ score (elas-
ticity 11.4%), which exceeds the MID cutoff (small effect, ES = 0.25), and a 10.4-percentage point increase in the proba-
bility of depression based on the GHQ cut-off. Moreover, results from the analysis on the specific GHQ and SF-12
factors suggest that the lowest SES experience a significant decline in all dimensions of mental health. We also observe
a statistically significant 2.4-point reduction in the PCS score (5.5%); although this effect on physical health is clinically
relevant under the ES definition (small effect, ES = 0.2), it is not minimally important according to the anchoring
approach (cutoff of 6.8 points).
4.1.2 | The wear-and-tear effect
We now investigate whether heterogeneity in the health effect of the reform can be explained by prolonged exposure to
jobs characterised by different levels of demand and control at work. This is often referred to as the “wear-and-tear”
effect of work, whereby each occupation carries a different level of physical and psychosocial occupational stress
(Karasek, 1979; Ravesteijn et al., 2018). We employ a job-exposure matrices (JEM) recently built by Kroll and
Lampert (2011) based on a large representative survey on working conditions in Germany. The JEM provides a
TABLE 2 Effect of State Pension age postponement on employment, GHQ, MCS, and PCS index
(1) In paid work (2) GHQ (3) GHQ cutoff (4) MCS (5) PCS
Being below-SPA 0.101*** (0.035) 1.993** (1.032) 0.062** (0.032) −0.773 (0.614) −0.564 (0.857)
Routine SES (ref.)
Intermediate SES −0.005 (0.023) −0.751 (0.634) −0.023 (0.021) 0.615* (0.371) 1.322** (0.619)
Manager SES −0.071*** (0.024) −1.860*** (0.595) −0.071*** (0.020) 1.039*** (0.371) 2.692*** (0.651)
Marital status (ref. “married/couple”)
Widowed/divorced 0.008 (0.019) 3.956*** (0.666) 0.119*** (0.019) −3.237*** (0.408) −3.269*** (0.535)
Single −0.090*** (0.034) 0.296 (1.124) 0.010 (0.037) −1.710** (0.819) −1.833* (1.079)
No children (ref.)
1–2 children −0.078*** (0.021) −0.905 (0.625) −0.032 (0.020) 0.224 (0.392) −0.728 (0.484)
3+ children −0.073*** (0.027) 0.736 (0.736) 0.010 (0.025) −0.623 (0.441) −2.250*** (0.656)
No education (ref.)
Low education 0.127*** (0.023) −0.816 (0.722) −0.031 (0.023) 1.028** (0.460) 2.966*** (0.628)
Mid or high education 0.194*** (0.025) −2.134*** (0.809) −0.053** (0.023) 1.857*** (0.526) 3.676*** (0.676)
Constant 2.087*** (0.767) 11.284 (29.883) −0.371 (0.899) 74.904*** (18.157) 34.826 (24.049)
N observations 7,374 7,374 7,374 7,374 7,374
N women 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531
Mean 0.435 30.4 0.33 51 46.8
Standard deviation 0.49 14 0.47 9.4 12.2
Note. Columns 1 and 3 report Linear Probability Model estimates for being in paid-work (yes/no) and being above the GHQ cutoff of 12+
(0–36 scale; Goldberg et al., 1997); Columns 2, 4, and 5 report OLS estimates for the GHQ, MCS, and PCS index (0 – least distressed; 100 –
most distressed). All estimates refer to Model (3.1). The status of being above/below SPA is defined by comparing the individual SPA (based
on month-year of birth) and the date of interview. The sample includes women aged 60–64 between 2009 and 2016, observed either
above-SPA (never affected by the reform) or below-SPA (affected by the reform), having been engaged in paid-work in their life. Additional
controls include fixed effects for age (in quarters), interview year (in quarters), and country and a linear control for year-and-month-of-birth.
Standard errors are clustered by year-and-month-of-birth (152 clusters).
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SES, socioeconomic status; SPA, State
Pension age.
*< 0.10.
**< 0.05.
***< 0.01.
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dichotomous index of job demand, which summarises five dimensions of occupational burden: Ergonomic Stress, Envi-
ronmental Pollution, Mental Stress, Social Stress, and Temporal Loads. This measure has been externally validated (see
Santi, Kroll, Dietz, Becher, and Ramroth (2013)) and recently applied in economics research (Mazzonna &
Peracchi, 2017). We complement this measure with dichotomous index of high/low job control built by Solovieva
et al. (2014) from a large survey on adult Finnish workers. The index summarises the degree of decision authority and
skill discretion and has been externally validated. Details are included in Appendix 1.3. We were able to match both
indices to 99% of our sample through respondents' current or last 4-digit ISCO code. Around 33% of the sample has
(had) a high-strain job, that is, highly physically or psychosocially demanding, with low authority and discretion. This
includes, for example, housekeeping and restaurant services, personal-carers, salespersons, cleaners, and machine oper-
ators. Among them, 85% belong to the routine SES (see Appendix 1.3).
We estimate model (3.1) interacting the SPA-eligibility, job-demand, and job-control indicators.7 Results (Table 5)
provide evidence that a postponement of SPA has a significant negative impact only on the health of women in high
straining occupations (high-demand, low-control): GHQ depression score increases by 3.8 points (27% of the variable's
standard deviation) with a mean elasticity of 13%, MCS score drops by 1.1 points (12% of standard deviation, elasticity
of 2.1%, only significant at 13%), and PCS drops by 2.1 points (17% of standard deviation, elasticity of 4.5%). The result
TABLE 3 Effect of State Pension age extent of postponement on GHQ, MCS, and PCS indices
(6) GHQ (7) GHQ cutoff (8) MCS (9) PCS
0 postponement (ref.)
1–6 months 0.051 (1.706) −0.003 (0.060) −0.114 (1.013) 0.363 (1.597)
6–24 months 1.963* (1.072) 0.069* (0.036) −0.579 (0.684) −0.569 (1.033)
24–36 months 2.318* (1.311) 0.061* (0.037) −1.126 (0.773) −0.635 (1.138)
36+ months 3.068** (1.508) 0.087** (0.044) −1.423* (0.844) −0.428 (1.509)
Routine job (reference)
Intermediate −0.768 (0.636) −0.024 (0.021) 0.620* (0.371) 1.320** (0.618)
Manager −1.867*** (0.596) −0.071*** (0.020) 1.041*** (0.371) 2.690*** (0.651)
Marital status (ref. “married/couple”)
Widowed/divorced 3.963*** (0.666) 0.120*** (0.019) −3.240*** (0.408) −3.269*** (0.535)
Single 0.287 (1.127) 0.010 (0.037) −1.704** (0.822) −1.828* (1.079)
No children (ref.)
1–2 children −0.907 (0.625) −0.032 (0.020) 0.223 (0.391) −0.728 (0.484)
3+ children 0.744 (0.736) 0.010 (0.025) −0.626 (0.441) −2.251*** (0.656)
No education (ref.)
Low education −0.812 (0.721) −0.031 (0.023) 1.024** (0.459) 2.963*** (0.629)
Mid or high education −2.125*** (0.811) −0.053** (0.023) 1.848*** (0.527) 3.676*** (0.677)
Constant 9.699 (30.030) −0.408 (0.912) 75.915*** (18.207) 34.393 (24.240)
N observations 7,374 7,374 7,374 7,374
N women 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531
Mean 30.4 0.33 51 46.8
Standard deviation 14 0.47 9.4 12.2
Note. Columns 6, 8, and 9 report OLS estimates for the GHQ, MCS and PCS index (0 - least distressed; 100 - most distressed); Column 2 reports
Linear Probability Model estimates for being above the GHQ cutoff of 12+ (0–36 scale; Goldberg et al., 1997). All estimates refer to Model
(3.3). The SPA postponement is measured as a difference in months between the individual-specific SPA postreform and the prereform
threshold of 60 years old. The sample includes women aged 60–64 between 2009 and 2016, observed either above-SPA (never affected by the
reform) or below-SPA (affected by the reform), having been engaged in paid-work in their life. Additional controls include fixed effects for
age (in quarters), interview year (in quarters), and country and a linear control for year-and-month-of-birth. Standard errors are clustered by
year-and-month-of-birth (152 clusters).
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SPA, State Pension age.
*< 0.10,
**< 0.05.
***< 0.01.
7We find no evidence of selection into nonstraining jobs due to the statutory pensionable age (SPA) change. Running models like (3.1) for the
probability of having a straining job, no effect of pension eligibility emerges (available upon request).
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for GHQ is a meaningful effect according to the MID criterion, with an ES of 0.27 SD. The probability of being clinically
depressed (based on the GHQ cut-off) increases by 12 percentage points (average prevalence 33%). Finally, it is worth
noting that the increase in labour market attachment is similar in magnitude and not statistically different between the
group that is exhibiting a health decline and those who are not. Thus, results do not seem to support the hypothesis that
the stronger effect on health for women in routine SES (or in high-strain jobs) is due to a stronger incentive to remain
employed.
4.2 | Robustness checks
4.2.1 | Diagnosed diseases
We investigate whether the observed health decline triggered the onset of chronic conditions, which could signifi-
cantly impact mortality and health care expenditure (Behncke, 2012). Given the recent implementation of the
reform, we focus on conditions which can plausibly be affected in the short term (Table 6). For each disease, we
exclude respondents who were diagnosed with the condition before entering the study (Moon, Glymour, Sub-
ramanian, Avendaño, and Kawachi (2012)). We estimate model (3.1) with a dichotomous dependent variable for
TABLE 4 Heterogeneous effect of State Pension age postponement by SES
Effect of being below-SPA
Mean (SD) (i) Overall effect (ii) Routine SES (iii) Intermediate SES (iv) Managerial SES
Share of N = 7,374 38.6% 28.1% 33.3%
In paid work 0.43 (0.49) 0.101*** (0.035) 0.098** (0.04) 0.135*** (0.045) 0.08* (0.043)
Health indices
GHQ score 30.4 (14) 1.993** (1.032) 3.468** (1.367) 1.039 (1.201) 1.179 (1.062)
GHQ cutoff 0.33 0.062** (0.032) 0.104** (0.040) 0.046 (0.037) 0.029 (0.035)
MCS score 51.0 (9.4) −0.773 (0.614) −1.059 (0.805) −0.777 (0.743) −0.478 (0.663)
PCS score 46.9 (12.2) −0.564 (0.857) −2.446** (1.074) 0.506 (1.142) 0.579 (1.000)
GHQ factors
Anxiety 27.6 (20.8) 2.491* (1.527) 3.973** (1.903) 0.887 (1.794) 2.138 (1.594)
Social dysfunction 36.6 (11.1) 1.400* (0.849) 2.588** (1.082) 0.855 (1.008) 0.586 (0.887)
Confidence loss 17.5 (21.2) 2.773** (1.380) 5.099** (1.969) 1.897 (1.604) 1.04 (1.512)
SF-12 factors
Physical function 48.0 (11.2) −0.573 (0.748) −1.926** (0.963) 0.081 (0.997) 0.332 (0.845)
Role physical 48.6 (10.7) −0.600 (0.729) −2.043** (0.928) 0.027 (0.943) 0.416 (0.811)
Bodily pain 47.4 (12.3) −0.561 (0.814) −2.489** (1.023) 0.192 (1.074) 0.856 (0.961)
General health 46.1 (12.6) −0.935 (0.836) −2.960*** (1.042) 0.887 (1.122) −0.187 (0.985)
Vitality 50.2 (10) −0.668 (0.634) −0.954 (0.797) −0.522 (0.812) −0.482 (0.712)
Social functioning 50.1 (10.4) −0.697 (0.597) −1.494* (0.851) −0.665 (0.804) 0.09 (0.695)
Role emotional 49.8 (11.3) −0.775 (0.619) −1.846** (0.847) −0.278 (0.811) −0.044 (0.643)
Mental 50.1 (15.7) −0.755 (0.652) −1.267 (0.843) −0.618 (0.771) −0.334 (0.668)
Note. We show coefficients for “being below-SPA” from Model (3.1) in Column i, and from Model (3.2) in Columns ii–iv, where we report
the net effect of being below-SPA for routine, intermediate, and managerial workers. Controls include fixed effects for age (in quarters),
interview year (in quarters), SES, living arrangements and marital status (married/in couple, widowed/divorced/separated, single), country,
number of children (0, 1–2, 3+), education (low, mid, or high degree), and a linear control for year-and-month of birth. The status of being
above/below SPA is defined by comparing the individual SPA (based on month-year of birth) and the date of interview. Standard errors are
clustered by year-and-month of birth. The sample includes women aged 60–64 between 2009 and 2016, observed either above-SPA (never
affected by the reform) or below-SPA (affected by the reform), having engaged in paid-work in their life.
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SES, socioeconomic status; SF-12,
Short-Form-12; SPA, State Pension age.
*< 0.10.
**< 0.05.
***< 0.01.
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having been newly diagnosed with the disease since the previous interview. We interact the pension-eligibility
dummy with the job-control and the job-demand dummies. Results in Table 6 show a statistically significant increase
only in the probability of a doctor's diagnosis of clinical depression (+1.5 percentage-points), only among women
with high-demand and low-control jobs (average incidence of new depression diagnoses = 1.1%, average baseline
prevalence of diagnosed-depression = 5.9%).8
4.2.2 | Placebo tests
We run a falsification test on the male population, whose work status should not be directly affected by the reform.
Although males might adjust their retirement decision as a result of their wife's retirement age, we would expect to see
8Due to data limitations, we cannot evaluate changes in healthy behaviours (e.g., drinking/smoking/exercising).
TABLE 5 Heterogeneous effect of State Pension age postponement by job demand and job control level
Effect of being below-SPA
Mean (SD)
(ii) High
control–low
demand
(iii) Low
control–high
demand
(iv) Low
control–low
demand
(v) High
control–high
demand
Share of N = 7,374 29% 33% 27% 11%
In paid work 0.43 (0.49) 0.092** (0.044) 0.100*** (0.040) 0.140*** (0.044) 0.099* (0.054)
Health indices
GHQ score 30.4 (14) 1.342 (1.264) 3.829*** (1.392) 1.183 (1.213) 1.150 (1.612)
GHQ cutoff 0.33 0.047 (0.039) 0.123*** (0.040) 0.035 (0.038) −0.008 (0.055)
MCS score 51.0 (9.4) −0.602 (0.736) −1.132 (0.853) −0.833 (0.769) −0.363 (0.956)
PCS score 46.9 (12.2) −0.023 (1.010) −2.092** (1.047) 0.211 (1.095) 0.401 (1.488)
GHQ factors
Anxiety 27.6 (20.8) 1.986 (1.894) 4.331** (1.885) 1.389 (1.791) 1.614 (2.375)
Confidence loss 36.6 (11.1) 0.809 (1.015) 2.689** (1.139) 1.113 (0.962) 1.193 (1.196)
Social dysfunction 17.5 (21.2) 1.815 (1.558) 6.210*** (2.002) 1.212 (1.851) 0.315 (2.546)
SF-12 factors
Physical functioning 48.0 (11.2) −1.143 (1.440) −2.179** (0.982) 0.005 (0.832) 0.843 (1.210)
Role physical 48.6 (10.7) −1.098 (1.325) −2.234** (0.970) 0.171 (0.755) 0.843 (1.178)
Bodily pain 47.4 (12.3) −0.976 (1.574) −2.879*** (1.060) 0.328 (0.866) 1.225 (1.313)
General health 46.1 (12.6) −1.236 (1.603) −3.479*** (1.046) 0.046 (0.933) 0.781 (1.489)
Vitality 50.2 (10) −0.259 (1.183) −1.083 (0.810) −0.548 (0.677) −0.244 (1.029)
Social functioning 50.1 (10.4) 0.602 (1.135) −2.107** (0.919) −0.586 (0.597) 0.653 (1.128)
Role emotional 49.8 (11.3) 0.221 (1.140) −2.384*** (0.911) −0.533 (0.618) 0.7 (1.012)
Mental 50.1 (15.7) −0.159 (1.306) −1.520* (0.883) −0.794 (0.695) 0.241 (0.905)
Note. We report OLS coefficients from a model based on (3.2), where we added a three-way interaction term between SPA eligibility
(below-SPA), high/low job control, and high/low job demand, which are also added as separate covariates. Columns i–iv report the net effect
of being below-SPA for routine (and nonroutine) groups with high- or low-demand jobs. Additional controls include socioeconomic status,
fixed effects for age (in quarters), interview year (in quarters), living arrangements and marital status (married, widowed/divorced/separated,
single), country, number of children (none, one–two, three, or more), education (low, mid, or high degree), and a linear control for
year-and-month of birth. The routine classification follows the National Statistics SEC-3 taxonomy. The status of being above/below SPA is
defined by comparing the individual SPA (based on month-year of birth) and the date of interview. High job demand was built and validated
by Santi et al. (2013); the job control measure was built and validated by Solovieva et al. (2014); both are linked to respondents' ISCO code.
Standard errors are clustered by year-and-month-of-birth. The sample includes women aged 60–64 between 2009 and 2016, observed either
above-SPA (never affected by the reform) or below-SPA (affected by the reform), having engaged in paid-work in their life.
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SPA, State Pension age.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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weaker effects for men than for women. After assigning women's SPA to men, based on their birthdate, with find no
effect of pension eligibility on male's employment or health (Table 7). We then focus on women who never engaged in
paid work and who are unlikely to be induced to work by the SPA postponement. Hence, the reform should not affect
this population's health. Due to a small sample (1,410 women aged 60–64 years), we have limited statistical power.
However, results suggest that being below-SPA does not affect any health index among those women (Table 7).
4.2.3 | Income effect
Previous research has found that the SPA-change reduced after-tax individual income for women by 20%, it had a
smaller effect on household income (−6%), and it increased absolute poverty rates between 6 and 8 percentage points,
yet it had no impact on material deprivation (Cribb et al., 2016; Cribb & Emmerson, 2018). In our sample, we estimate
that the SPA-reform reduced individual and household median after-tax income by 12% and 6.7%, respectively, and it
increased absolute poverty rates by 6 percentage points (baseline poverty rate among untreated women is 11.7%). Full
details are in Appendix 1.5.
A reduction in income may translate into negative mental health consequences, for example, by reducing the ability
to afford basic goods or increasing the likelihood of individual and household indebtedness (Keese and Schmitz, 2014).
We thus re-estimate our models by including household or individual log-income as additional regressor to examine
whether this might affect the results (Table 8, Panel 1; models controlling for individual income are available on
request). The results are very similar to those in models that do not control for income. Although not a conclusive test,
this suggests that the negative effects of the reform on mental and physical health might not only be attributable to the
reduction in income.
TABLE 6 Effect of being below-SPA on new diagnosis of chronic conditions, by SES and job demand level
Effect of being below-SPA
Average incidence
of new diagnoses N
(ii) High
control–low
demand
(iii) Low
control–high
demand
(iv) Low
control–low
demand
(v) High
control–high
demand
Arthritis 0.048 3,428 0.005 (0.019) 0.032 (0.022) −0.014 (0.021) −0.012 (0.026)
Coronary heart disease 0.004 4,852 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.006)
Angina 0.004 4,779 0.007 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.009 (0.008)
Heart attack 0.002 4,810 −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.002) −0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.003)
Liver condition 0.004 4,850 0.002 (0.005) −0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006)
Diabetes 0.01 4,588 0.004 (0.007) −0.001 (0.007) 0.018 (0.006) 0.012 (0.010)
High blood pressure 0.043 3,727 −0.004 (0.015) −0.028 (0.020) −0.002 (0.019) −0.002 (0.022)
Clinical depression 0.011 4,643 0.007 (0.006) 0.015** (0.007) 0.006 (0.008) 0.013 (0.012)
Note. We report OLS coefficients from Model (3.1) where we added a three-way interaction term between SPA eligibility (below-SPA),
high/low job control, and high/low job demand, which are also added as separate covariates. Columns i–iv report the net effect of being
below-SPA on incidence of new diagnoses, for routine (and nonroutine) groups with high- or low-demand jobs. Additional controls include
fixed effects for age (in quarters), interview year (in quarters), living arrangements and marital status (married, widowed/divorced/separated,
single), country, number of children (none, one–two, three or more), education (low, mid, or high degree), and a linear control for
year-and-month of birth. The routine classification follows the National Statistics SEC-3 taxonomy. The status of being above/below SPA is
defined by comparing the individual SPA (based on month-year of birth) and the date of interview. High job-demand is measured through
the JEM by Santi et al. (2013); job-control is measured through the JEM by Solovieva et al. (2014); both are linked to respondents' ISCO code.
Standard errors are clustered by year-and-month of birth. The sample includes women aged 60–64 years between 2009 and 2016, observed
either above-SPA (never affected by the reform) or below-SPA (affected by the reform), having been engaged in paid-work in their life,
excluding those reporting to have been diagnosed with the specific disease at baseline. The share of respondents in the main sample (7,374
obs.) who, at baseline, had already been diagnosed for a specific condition is as follows: arthritis 0.311, coronary heart disease 0.012, angina
0.028, heart attack 0.019, liver condition 0.012, diabetes 0.069, high blood pressure 0.251, and clinical depression 0.059.
Abbreviations: JEM, job-exposure matrices; SES, socioeconomic status; SPA, State Pension age.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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4.2.4 | Econometric specification and common trend assumption
As our sample includes repeated observations for some individuals, we test that our results are robust to clustering the
standard errors at the individual level (Table 8, Panel 2). Results are also robust to alternative specifications for age and
time, such as adopting (a) a linear specification or (b) a quadratic specification for age-quarter and year-quarter
(Table 8, Panels 3 and 4) or dropping the control for year-month-of-birth (upon request).9 Moreover, implementing
alternative GHQ cut-offs (e.g., Aalto, Elovainio, Kivimäki, Uutela, and Pirkola (2012)) leads to very similar results
(available upon request). Our results are robust to alternative sample selections, to controlling for long-term conditions
diagnosed prior to the policy, and to controlling for partner's age (Appendix 1.5). Furthermore, our effects are similar
for respondents that had been diagnosed with a chronic condition and those who were free of a diagnosis prior to base-
line (Appendix 1.5).
Our identification approach assumes that treated and control would have had similar health trends in the absence
of the reform. We test whether birth cohorts treated by the reform (birth cohort 1950–1955) had different health levels
and trends relative to cohorts unaffected by the SPA change (birth cohort 1944–1949) when at the same age. Using Brit-
ish Household Panel Survey, we look at health outcomes in 2000 and 2003 for the control group (aged 50–55 years in
2000 and 53–58 years in 2003) and for the treatment group in 2005 and 2008 (aged 50–55 years in 2005 and 53–58 years
in 2008). Figure 3 Panel (ii) shows no difference in health levels or trends prior to the reform (see Appendix 1.4).
We also examine health trends for treated and control prior to the reform. As our survey started in 2009, we explore
data from the British Household Panel Survey (the precursor of Understanding Society, comparable in both sampling
and variables collected), focusing on the GHQ score. We first test whether, in the years 1999–2008, GHQ scores were
different between women aged 60–61 and 62–64 years (5,041 observations). Both groups are above-SPA between 1999
TABLE 8 Effect of State Pension age postponement on health, sensitivity analysis
Effect of being below-SPA
(i)Overall effect
(ii) High
control–low
demand
(iii) Low
control–high
demand
(iv) Low
control–low
demand
(v) High
control–high
demand
(1) Including after-tax household log-income as regressor (N = 7,374)
GHQ score 2.101** (1.035) 1.309 (1.247) 3.817*** (1.423) 1.331 (1.221) 1.480 (1.650)
GHQ cut-off 0.055* (0.032) 0.038 (0.038) 0.116*** (0.042) 0.035 (0.039) −0.004 (0.058)
MCS score −0.921 (0.629) −0.680 0.737) −1.189 (0.878) −0.884 (0.791) −0.540 (0.974)
PCS score −0.553 (0.877) 0.052 (0.981) −1.943** (1.060) 0.157 (1.123) 0.442 (1.493)
(2) Standard errors clustered at individual level (3,494 clusters, N = 7,374)
GHQ score 1.993* (1.054) 1.342 (1.236) 3.829*** (1.314) 1.183 (1.323) 1.150 (1.619)
GHQ cut-off 0.062* (0.033) 0.047 (0.039) 0.123*** (0.040) 0.035 (0.041) −0.008 (0.053)
MCS score −0.773 (0.676) −0.602 (0.771) −1.132 (0.857) −0.833 (0.845) −0.363 (1.071)
PCS score −0.564 (0.926) −0.023 (1.052) −2.092** (1.161) 0.211 (1.152) 0.401 (1.474)
(3) Alternative age/time control: linear specification for age-quarter and year-quarter (N = 7,374)
GHQ score 2.170** (1.030) 1.524 (1.247) 4.078*** (1.372) 1.388 (1.251) 1.230 (1.602)
GHQ cut-off 0.055* (0.031) 0.042 (0.038) 0.112*** (0.040) 0.029 (0.039) −0.018 (0.056)
MCS score −0.867 (0.597) −0.680 (0.722) −1.28* (0.835) −0.911 (0.766) −0.341 (0.931)
PCS score −0.814 (0.857) −0.333 (0.980) −2.3** (1.047) −0.033 (1.092) 0.067 (1.499)
(4) Alternative age/time control: quadratic specification for age-quarter and year-quarter (N = 7,374)
GHQ score 1.968* (1.023) 1.310 (1.239) 3.892*** (1.384) 1.196 (1.232) 1.020 (1.573)
GHQ cut-off 0.056* (0.032) 0.043 (0.038) 0.121*** (0.040) 0.03 (0.039) −0.017 (0.056)
MCS score −0.774 (0.612) −0.587 0.734) −1.2 (0.848) −0.828 (0.773) −0.246 (0.946)
PCS score −0.620 (0.865) −0.132 (1.004) −2.13** (1.051) 0.144 (1.099) 0.283 (1.489)
Columns ii–v report the net effect of being below-SPA for women with high or low job control and with high or low job demand.
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SPA, State Pension age.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
9Our results are robust to allowing for heterogeneous age and time trends by job type (available on request).
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and 2008, while 60–61-year-olds are affected by the SPA change after 2010. GHQ levels and trends were virtually identi-
cal for treated and control (see Figure 3 Panel (i) and Appendix 1.4 for details). Furthermore, we show that the two
groups do not differ in the prevalence of functional limitations, using the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (years
2002–2008, see Appendix 1.4).
Our approach also assumes that age effects are cohort-constant. This assumption may be violated if there is com-
pression of morbidity, that is, cohorts born later have better health at any given age due of postponement of disease or
disability (Jagger et al., 2016). This pattern, however, is unlikely to explain our results due to several reasons. First, if
there was compression of morbidity, our findings would likely be lower-bound estimates because we find that later born
cohorts (exposed to the pension reform) have worse health than cohorts born earlier (unexposed to the reform). If any-
thing, compression of morbidity would lead to underestimation of the true causal effect of the reform. Second, our sam-
ple comprises a narrow range of age and cohort groups. This makes the assumption of cohort-constant age effects
plausible, as compression of morbidity typically occurs over long time frames. Appendix Figure 5 illustrates the maxi-
mum range of birth-years that we observe for each age-group in the sample. As an example, among women aged
60 years, we observe women born between 1948 and 1956. Among women aged 63 years, the birth cohorts range
between 1945 and 1950. Hence, the largest cohort differences are at most 8 or 5 years. It is unlikely that such differences
would substantially impact the health conditions of women at a given age. We also note that there appears to be no
consensus on whether the United Kingdom and other high-income countries are experiencing compression of morbid-
ity. The evidence is, at best, mixed and strongly dependent on method and outcome (Crimmins & Beltrán-Sánchez,-
2011; Gondek, Bann, Ning, Grundy, & Ploubidis, 2019; Rechel et al., 2013). For example, a recent study for England
covering a 20-years time interval reports compression of morbidity for cognitive impairment and self-perceived health,
but dynamic equilibrium for disability (i.e., less severe disability is increasing but more severe disability is not; Jagger
et al., 2016).
Although not a conclusive test of morbidity compression, we followed Cribb et al. (2016) and performed an addi-
tional robustness test by allowing the age effects to vary by cohort. This is obtained by adding an interaction term
between age dummies (in quarters) and birth-year dummies to a set of controls which included dummies for age
(in quarters), dummies for time (in quarters), and dummies for birth-year. Because cohort effects are included using
birth-year while age and time are measured in quarters, there is no perfect collinearity between the three set of vari-
ables. When adding the interaction term between age-quarter and birth-year, identification relies on the fact that
women born in the same year may have different pension eligibility depending on their age-quarter at the time of inter-
view: a person aged 62q1 born in 1952q1 would be eligible for pension, while a person aged 62q1 born in 1952q3 would
not be eligible. Our results are robust and confirmed under this specification (results available upon request).
FIGURE 3 common trend evidence for General Health Question (GHQ) scores, by age cohorts (i) and birth cohorts (ii), from British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
Note. data from BHPS. Panel (i) plots average GHQ score (0 to 36) from 1999 to 2008 for women aged 60–61 and 62–64 years in each year
(5,041 obs.). Panel (ii) plots GHQ scores for the control group (women born from 1944 to 1949) in 2000 (aged 50 to 55 years) and in 2003
(aged 53 to 58 years); and for the treated group (women born from 1950 to 1955), in 2005 (aged 50 to 55) and 2008 (aged 53 to 58; 2,779 obs.).
Appendix 1.4 includes full regressions' results [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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4.2.5 | Persistency of the effect for affected women
Our models might capture a very short-term increase in depression and anxiety for being “forced” to work longer in
high-strain jobs to qualify for the pension (with a lower lifetime income). Data availability prevents us from establishing
whether these effects are long-lasting: the first affected cohorts have only been exposed for a few months/years, while
the most affected cohorts reach their SPA in 2017 or later. However, we show that the observed health effects do not
dissipate over time for women who are still below SPA. We build a categorical variable capturing the amount of time a
person has spent below SPA, at the time of interview, with four levels: having been “below SPA” for 1, 2, 3, or more
years at the time of the interview (reference is “being above SPA”). We then estimate model (3.1), interacting the expo-
sure variables with a simplified SES measure (low-SES vs. mid-high SES) as follows:
yiat = α+ β1 belowSPA for 1 yearð Þiat + β2 belowSPA for 2 yearsð Þiat + β3 belowSPA for 3+ yearsð Þiat + β4
belowSPA for 1 yearð Þiat  routine+ β5 belowSPA for 2 yearsð Þiat  routine+ β6 belowSPA for 3+ yearsð Þiat  routine+ β7
 routine+ γa + ηt + δc +X0iatφ+ εiat:
TABLE 9 Persistency of health effects for women below SPA
(6) GHQ (7) GHQ cut-off (8) MCS (9) PCS N obs
Low SES 2,844
Not affected by reform (ref.) 1,968
t < 1 year spent below SPA 2.868** (1.443) 0.109** (0.046) −0.919 (0.855) −1.658 (1.041) 461
1 < t < 2 years spent below SPA 3.983** (1.535) 0.089** (0.043) −0.824 (0.907) −3.549** (1.298) 307
t > 2 years spent below SPA 4.426** (2.253) 0.135* (0.073) −2.502* (1.33) −3.372** (1.628) 108
Mid-high SES 4,530
Not affected by reform (ref.) - - - - 2,774
t < 1 year spent below SPA 1.001 (1.147) 0.049 (0.039) −0.769 (0.678) 0.593 (0.847) 955
1 < t < 2 years spent below SPA 1.230 (1.114) 0..038 (0.035) −0.715 (0.705) 0.209 (1.060) 554
t > 2 years spent below SPA 0.753 −0.011 0.185 1.385 247
(1.406) (0.047) (0.826) (1.303)
Abbreviations: GHQ, General Health Question; MCS, mental health score; PCS, physical health score; SES, socioeconomic status; SPA, State
Pension age.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
FIGURE 4 Persistency of the reform-effect
on depression for women below statutory
pensionable age (SPA) [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Results in Table 9 (and Figure 4) suggest that the health effects are persistent for women in low SES, and, therefore,
do not seem to reflect only a “surprise” effect.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our results show that the increase in the female State Pension age in the United Kingdom widened health disparities
between 2009 and 2016. Specifically, women in lower socioeconomic groups affected by the reform suffered from
declines in mental health, which are economically and clinically relevant (a MID), and increased the prevalence of self-
reported clinical depression diagnosis. We also found a statistically significant negative effect on physical health for
women in the lower socioeconomic group. However, this effect is likely of less clinical relevance.
Our findings are consistent with evidence on—more limited—SPA reforms in the Netherlands (De Grip et al., 2012)
and Israel (Shai, 2018) and further suggest that the main mechanism for the observed health deterioration is longer
exposure jobs with high demand and low control at work. This can be interpreted in light of theoretical and empirical
literature linking straining occupations with health capital degradation, lower productivity, and worse health
(Barnay, 2016; Bildt & Michélsen, 2002; Chandola & Zhang, 2017; Fischer & Sousa-Poza, 2009; Paccagnella, 2016;
Ravesteijn et al., 2018).
A possible alternative explanation may lie on the detrimental impact of the reform on after-tax individual and
household income and on absolute poverty rates (see also Cribb and Emmerson (2018)). This may be partly due to the
fact that rates of reemployment are relatively low for older workers due to their higher skill specificity and the risk of
age discrimination (OECD, 2017b), especially for routine and manual workers, who are most affected by comp-
uterisation and offshoring (Autor & Dorn, 2009). Moreover, the reduction in income is stronger for women in lower
socioeconomic groups, which are also those whose health has been most affected by the SPA reform. However, our
results are not affected by the inclusion of income measures as covariates, suggesting that the health deterioration
might not only be attributable to changes in income.
Our findings may also be attributable to the lack of awareness of women about the reform, as a late and unex-
pected SPA-change may disrupt pensions-plans, thus generating anxiety and depression (De Grip et al., 2012; Falba,
Sindelar, & Gallo, 2009; van Solinge & Henkens, 2017). However, although before 2010 women in lower SES were
indeed less aware of the SPA increase than higher SES women (Clery, Humphrey, & Bourne, 2009; MacLeod
et al., 2012), recent evidence from Holman, Foster, and Hess (2018) shows that the SPA-change was “almost com-
mon knowledge” across all socioeconomic groups by the time the reform came into place (2010/2011), partly due to
an extensive public information campaign. Our own findings (Table 3) suggest that the reform's health effects are
larger for women facing larger postponements, who turned 60 years old since 2013, when SPA knowledge was wide-
spread. All in all, this evidence does not seem to support lack of awareness as the main explanation for the increase
in mental health problems.
Our results estimate the impact of an SPA-increase on health in the months or first years following the introduction
of the reform. We are not able to establish whether these effects are long-lasting, as the first cohorts affected by the
reform have only been exposed for a short time. Likewise, our models compare outcomes between cohorts exposed to
the old-SPA and those that have been for the first time exposed to the new-SPA regime. One might argue that subse-
quent cohorts might react differently to an increase in the SPA, an assumption that can only be tested in future waves
of Understanding Society.
Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests, including a falsification test for women who never worked
and for men, as well as tests for the common-trends assumption. We also show that violation of the assumption
of cohort-constant age effects is unlikely in our sample and would not provide a credible explanation for our
results.
Although the State Pension age will continue to increase in OECD countries (OECD, 2017a), our findings suggest
that negative health consequences of these reforms have been overlooked and should be considered in cost-effectiveness
policy evaluations, as they might outweigh some of the potential benefits from later retirement. Mental illness impacts
directly on health-care costs, disability benefit payments and service use, as well as indirectly, for example, by imposing
a burden on caregivers and their productivity. Mental disorders hamper labour market productivity (Bubonya, Cobb-
Clark, & Wooden, 2017) and are a leading cause of disability worldwide, being associated with the onset of other physi-
cal health conditions such as cancer, CVD, and diabetes, which may exacerbate their impact on productivity and the
economy (Prince et al., 2007). As a result, mental illness constitutes a major burden for public budgets, estimated at
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more than 4% of GDP in the United Kingdom and in OECD countries (Arends, Baer, Miranda, Prinz, & Singh, 2014;
OECD/EU, 2018; WHO, 2013).
There are two possible policy implications from our findings. First, the fact that the negative health effects of the
reform are confined to women from highly demanding occupations raises potential questions about fairness, and
whether eligibility rules should consider occupation as a potential criterion for SPA (Wester & Wolff, 2010). Second,
national policies that increase the State Pension age may need to consider strategies to prevent negative health conse-
quences for women in manual and routine occupations, for example, through inclusive labour market policies that
facilitate a smooth transition to retirement (OECD, 2017b).
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